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In this paper, estimates of the effects of local domestic property taxes (rates) on local house prices
are presented, and the effect of local taxes on owner-occupied dwelling prices is calculated for a
number of English cities for the period up to 1990. The methods used enable estimation to be made
of the effect of the introduction, during 1990, of the Community Charge or poll tax in England,
when the local tax base was moved from housing consumption onto individual residency. It is
estimated that the reform could have increased house prices by around 15 per cent and contributed
substantially to house price inflation.
JEL classification: H71, R31.
I. INTRODUCTION
The place and importance of the housing market within the general economy of
the UK is receiving growing attention (Miles, 1994; Meen, 1996; Muellbauer
and Murphy, 1997). Much of this increased attention arises out of, and has, at
least in part, aimed at an explanation for, the soaring house price inflation that
occurred up to 1990. Discussion in this field has centred on and around wealth
effects and the increasing financial liberalisation of the mortgage markets over
the 1980s. There remains, however, in this context, a major, celebrated and
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conspicuous tax policy change during the period that has received only passing
mention in the literature.
1 This policy change was the replacement of local
domestic rates by the poll tax (properly, the Community Charge) in 1989–90.
There is ample theoretical and casual basis for belief that there is a
relationship between the tax liability attached to the ownership and consumption
of a durable asset and its market price. Up to April 1989 in Scotland, and April
1990 in England and Wales, local domestic taxes were raised through rates, an
excise-like tax related to annual housing consumption, with liability falling on
the household. Rates were replaced by the poll tax, which was a lump-sum
payment system payable by individuals based purely upon local area residency
and was independent of the amount of housing consumed. The removal of tax
liability from a durable product will be expected to increase its asset value, and
the period of change from rates to the poll tax coincided with the height of the
housing price boom of the 1980s in the UK. Following public unrest, the poll tax
was replaced, in 1993, by the council tax, which reintroduced a link to housing
consumption levels. The period of the change back from the poll tax to the
council tax coincided with a fall in the real price of housing.
Despite the potentially important implications of this local tax reform for the
course of house price inflation, there exists little empirical evidence on the
effects of these changes on the market price of housing in the UK. One pre-
implementation estimate is Hughes (1988), who concluded that there might be
11–17 per cent increases in average house prices around the English regions.
2
The remaining literature on the economic analysis of these tax changes has
concentrated almost exclusively on the relative distributional burden of their
formal incidence (Smith, 1991; Giles and Ridge, 1993).
Empirically, one way of approaching the interaction of local taxes and house
prices is to consider the degree of tax capitalisation, which measures the extent
to which the burden of increased (reduced) future tax liabilities is shifted onto
present owners in the form of lower (higher) current asset values. For the US,
using aggregated data over a number of tax jurisdictions to compare mean house
prices and mean local tax rates (for example, Oates (1969), Rosen (1982) and
Wassmer (1993)) or using data at individual-dwelling levels (for example,
Yinger et al. (1988) and Palmon and Smith (1998)), studies have found a wide
range of values for the degree of tax capitalisation, but ‘best-bet’ estimates
emerge at between 10 and 35 per cent. For the UK, Topham and Ward (1992)
present an attempt at estimating the effects of local tax and expenditure on house
prices.
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been undertaken by the economics profession’ (Greenaway, 1991, p. 575).
2Department of the Environment (1986) suggests, on little apparent evidence, that house prices might rise by 5
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The purpose of the current paper is to present a new empirical analysis of the
interaction between local property tax levels and house prices in the UK. These
estimates are then used to estimate the market price effects of the reforms of the
local tax system in 1989–90. The results indicate that these tax reforms probably
contributed substantially to the observed real house price changes of the period.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, a brief review of the different local
tax regimes is presented, and the theory, empirical approach and data sources are
introduced in Section III. The underlying empirical results are presented and
discussed in Section IV, and Section V applies these results to obtain estimates
of the effects of local tax reforms to house price inflation over the late 1980s.
Section VI provides a summary and conclusion.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LOCAL TAX FINANCE IN THE UK
‘The rates are one of the highest and the worst taxes under which
Englishmen and English industry have ever groaned.’
(Trevelyan, 1907, p. 30)
The system of rates had had a venerable history in Britain until replaced in 1989
(Scotland) and 1990 (England and Wales). Rates were levied on both domestic
and commercial property in a local area, and, by the 1980s, the system was
applied in the following manner. In all areas, each property (domestic or
commercial) was individually assessed on the basis of an ‘annual rental value’
and assigned a rateable value, which had been last updated for all properties in
England and Wales in 1973. Each local authority determined the total amount it
needed to raise from its own domestic and commercial ratepayers, and so
determined a rate poundage, which expressed how much tax was to be paid per
unit of rateable value. Normally, a lower per-unit tax was applied to domestic
properties than to commercial, called domestic rate poundage. Thus, for each
domestic property,
Tax bill = Rates = RV × DRP
where  RV is rateable value and DRP is domestic rate poundage. Formal
incidence always lay with the household resident in the dwelling, and low-
income households received rates relief through the housing benefit section of
the benefit system.
The poll tax or Community Charge was introduced in England and Wales in
April 1990, and a year earlier in Scotland, and was replaced throughout Britain
in April 1993. The poll tax was levied on individual domestic residency rather
than on property consumption, value or ownership. Briefly, the system worked
by each local authority first determining the total amount it needed to raise from
its own domestic residents. Dividing this total by the number of eligible adultFiscal Studies
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residents within the authority determined the poll tax per eligible resident.
Primary liability to pay rested on the individual and was independent of either
the property value of the occupied dwelling or the ability to pay of the resident.
The larger the number of adults in the household, therefore, the more poll taxes
the household faced. A small number of groups were allowed exemption and
lowered liability, and low-income groups were able to get some tapered rebates
through a rebate system. The introduction of the poll tax coincided with an
increase in the total amount of local tax raised from the average household,
which certainly heightened its already undoubted unpopularity.
The council tax replaced the poll tax in April 1993 and reintroduced a
connection between property valuation and tax liability, whilst retaining a link
between household size and liability. Briefly, in the council tax system, each
domestic dwelling is assessed by market value (as at April 1991) and assigned to
one band of an eight-band range. The relative tax payable by properties in each
band relative to other bands was laid down. Given the total local domestic
taxation to be raised by each local authority, and the number and distribution of
properties within the locality over the tax bands, the whole range of tax liabilities
is generated. A link with the poll tax was retained in that discounts for single-
person households were made available, and other concessions and rebates were
introduced. The average local tax liability of households was, at the same time,
greatly reduced, which undoubtedly eased this new tax’s passage.
3
III. THEORY AND DATA
For an individual property, no-arbitrage conditions suggest that the current
market price of a property must reflect the present value of the stream of services
derivable from that property, allowing for the tax liabilities and value of local
government services that attach:
(1) ∑
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where subscript i refers to the individual property, subscript j to the location of
the property, subscript t to the time period and subscript k to future periods, and
m is the property lifetime. PPijt is the market price of the property; Rjt is annual
rental return per unit; Hi is the quantity of housing in the dwelling; Tijt is the
annual total tax liability; Ejt is a measure of annual locally-provided public
services; and r is the rate of discount. The formulation may be simplified by
                                                                                                                                   
3For the introduction of the council tax, around £5 billion was transferred from being raised from local taxation
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assuming an infinite property life and constant annual returns and that people
expect the current stream of returns and taxes to continue into the future; thus
r E T H R PP jt ijt i jt ijt / ) ( + − = .
This formulation implies that complete capitalisation of taxes into capital value
occurs for local property taxation. It may well be that less than 100 per cent of
changes in the present value of future local tax liability or service provision
become capitalised into current market price: for example, only where supply is
perfectly elastic will capitalisation be complete. We therefore use the more
general form
r E k T k H R PP jt ijt i jt ijt / ) ( 2 1 + − =
or
(2) jt ijt i jt ijt E a T a H R a PP 2 1 0 ) ( + + =
where a0 = 1/r, a1 = –k1/r and a2 = k2/r. The parameters k1 and k2 measure the
degree of capitalisation of tax and services into house prices, respectively.
The approach adopted in this paper proceeds from equation (2) to estimate
the connection between tax payable and house purchase price under the rates
system of local taxation. For owner-occupied properties, RjtHi — the annual
return from a dwelling — cannot be observed directly, so we use a number of
physical characteristics (Xi), including location and time variables, in its place.
Adding a random error term, uijt, the model becomes
(3) ijt jt ijt ijt u E a T a a PP + + + = 2 1 0 ) ( i X .
Problems arise in estimating equation (3), because T ijt and uijt  cannot be
presumed to be independent, as required for direct estimation by ordinary least
squares (OLS). This is because properties with, say, unexpectedly high purchase
prices (and therefore positive uijt) because of unrecorded desirable dwelling
features will tend to have rateable values (and therefore tax liabilities) above
average. Tijt and uijt will be positively correlated. Potentially serious econometric
problems could arise were no account to be taken of this. One general method
for tackling such problems is the method of instrumental variables (IV), and this
is utilised here.
4
                                                                                                                                   
4In England and Wales, rateable values were based on 1973 valuations of annual rental value and therefore
themselves depend upon physical characteristics. So
RVi = f(Xi) = d0 Xi + viFiscal Studies
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Equation (3) also takes note that local expenditure levels by local authorities
can also have effects on the desirability and price of individual dwellings
benefiting from that expenditure. On the local expenditure side, under the UK
system of local government finance, the link between the domestic revenues
from locally-raised taxes and service expenditures for individual tax jurisdictions
is not as direct as might be first imagined. For the UK, local government
expenditures are only partially funded by local taxes paid on local domestic
properties. The bulk of the financing of services is covered by direct grants from
central government and by the local taxes paid by commercial, industrial and
other properties. For the period covered in this research, the percentage of total
local expenditure covered by rates on domestic properties was only about 25 per
cent for London, and under 22 per cent for the other Metropolitan Counties.
Indeed, the link was further attenuated as the rate support grant system, which
determined central grant provision for the period under study, was explicitly
constructed so that any locally-instigated increases in taxation were offset by
reductions in grants available from central funds. Nevertheless, in order to avoid
any endogeneity problems on the expenditure side, the service expenditure
variable used in estimation was also instrumented.
5
Data on house prices, dwelling rateable value and associated physical
characteristics for individual properties come from the 5% Sample Survey of
Building Society Mortgages, over the nine tax years from 1981–82 until 1989–
90 (Department of the Environment, 1988). The 5% Sample Survey database
                                                                                                                                   
where vi is a random error term. We know that, under rates, tax paid is determined by rateable value and
domestic rate poundage, so
Tijt = RVi × DRPjt
where RV is rateable value and DRP is domestic rate poundage. We may therefore obtain
Tijt = (d0 Xi + vi) × DRPjt,
which suggests employing the product of the physical characteristics variables and domestic rate poundage,
which will be uncorrelated with uijt, as part of the instrumental variable procedure.
The IV technique involves a two-stage process whereby any endogenous explanatory variables in the system
(tax liability, Tijt, and service expenditure, Ejt) are first separately regressed upon the exogenous variables
within the system (including the set of Xi×DRPjt, Grant Related Expenditure (GRE) and other variables). The
predicted values for Tijt and Ejt resulting are then used in the substantive second stage and standard-error
calculations are appropriately modified. Only the results from the second stage of the IV estimation process are
reproduced here. The use of OLS directly and inappropriately on equation (3) results in positive and significant
coefficients on tax liability and an erroneous conclusion that increased tax liabilities lead to an increase in
purchase price.
5The search for potential instruments correlated with local service expenditure per head but uncorrelated with
local tax levels soon comes across Grant Related Expenditure (GRE) as a possibility. This was calculated by
central authority as part of the rate support grant system which determined the amount of grant allocated to
each local authority by central government. The GRE for an individual authority was aimed at providing a
standard for assessing expenditure needs for the authority, based upon demographic and other factors. As
actual or potential expenditure or rates revenue took no part in this calculation, GRE per head becomes a
potentially good instrument for actual expenditure, and all estimates presented below come from procedures




Variable name Short description
MARKET PRICE
Real Purchase Price Dwelling purchase price, deflated to April 1985 (£100s)
TAX VARIABLE
TaxBill Total tax bill: total local annual tax liability per household,
deflated to April 1985 real value (£100s) (Instrumented)
EXPENDITURE
Services Services expenditure: total local annual expenditure on
services per household, deflated to April 1985 real values
(£100s) (Instrumented)
PROPERTY AGE (dummy variables)
New Built New property, first sale (excluded category)




Age-V Built after 1980, second-hand




Terraced Terraced house (excluded category)
Flat-I Flat or maisonette in converted house
Flat-II Purpose-built flat or maisonette
NUMBER OF ROOMS (discrete variables)
Rooms Number of habitable rooms
Rooms^2 Square of number of rooms
Rooms^3 Cube of number of rooms
Garage Property includes garage (dummy variable)
LOCATION DUMMIES Dummies for location within Metropolitan Counties (see
Appendix Table A.1 for key)
TIME DUMMIES 35 dummies for quarters
Note: All nominal values (purchase price, domestic rate poundage, expenditure) are deflated to April 1985
values using the non-housing-cost portion of the retail price index.Fiscal Studies
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strictly identifies the location of observations down to a local-tax-setting
jurisdictional level only for the six former English Metropolitan Counties plus
Inner and Outer London, so the analysis is restricted to these eight housing
markets. The information collected refers to individual new mortgages issued by
building societies in the UK, and records data on the dwellings concerned as
described in Table 1. As may be seen, the information on individual dwellings
recorded there, whilst less than that ideally desired, provides a fair number of the
most important relevant variables on physical characteristics to act as
conditioning variables in the estimating equations below. Dummies for local
authority areas will pick up area unobserved fixed effects.
The source of information on local authority finance is CIPFA (1981–91),
which provides jurisdictional domestic rate poundages and measures of annual
expenditure on services per tax year per household. Unlike local tax liability for
dwellings, local authority service expenditure per household for an observation
will be equal for all individual households observed in a particular local district
during a given year.
The object of the empirical approach adopted is to identify the effects of rates
on house prices from cross-section correlations of house prices and rates. As the
observations used stretch over 36 quarterly periods from 1981 to 1990, 35
dummies representing particular quarters are utilised at all stages. Any effects
common to all transactions observed for one quarter will be reflected in the
parameter values attached to the dummy taking the value of unity for that
quarter. These parameters will pick up both general rises in real house prices for
the quarter and specific effects due to policy changes, such as the ending of
double mortgage tax relief in August 1988. The quarterly time dummies may
also pick up some of the effects due to the anticipation of the coming tax reforms
following the announcements of the reforms in the Green Paper of 1986
(Department of the Environment, 1986).
IV. RESULTS
The substantive results of the model estimation are presented in Table 2. The
coefficients on physical characteristics and location (multiplied by 100) are often
interpreted as hedonic prices (£s) attached to the particular characteristic
involved.  In general, the signs and magnitudes derived seem reasonable and
underline well-known characteristics of the UK housing market. The results
presented are reasonably, if not perfectly, consistent over the eight metropolitan
areas.
US studies have often found the expenditure side of local government
processes to be important determinants of property values (for example,
Mieszkowski and Zodrow (1989)). Given a tax liability, particularly beneficial
and/or large applications on the expenditure side should be associated withTABLE 2
Overall Tax Effects on Real Purchase Price: IV Estimation (Dependent Variable: Real Purchase Price)
Merseyside Tyne & Wear South Yorkshire West Yorkshire
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
TaxBill –9.02 –2.22 –8.82 –2.01 –10.22 –3.25 –8.53 –3.11
Services –1.78 –0.13 –29.21 –2.29 2.06 0.28 8.42 2.23
(New Built)
Age-I –18.07 –1.65 –50.22 –3.97 –14.19 –1.36 –3.52 –0.55
Age-II –6.77 –0.69 –53.14 –4.35 –28.72 –3.00 –21.22 –3.55
Age-III –35.70 –3.61 –91.91 –7.39 –57.42 –5.96 –30.78 –5.01
Age-IV –25.61 –2.58 –62.77 –5.23 –26.58 –2.88 –11.83 –2.03
Age-V –26.22 –2.02 –13.40 –1.01 –0.41 –0.04 31.51 4.13
(Terraced)
Bung 170.51 16.32 83.05 10.58 173.63 26.61 115.82 19.80
Detach 230.97 22.73 157.76 13.86 155.41 21.78 165.28 24.90
Semi 76.32 16.73 37.29 7.28 52.94 14.37 45.32 13.33
Flat-I 40.25 2.59 –0.54 –0.06 5.26 0.30 52.68 4.04
Flat-II 34.13 2.84 –21.22 –4.15 26.48 2.51 40.04 3.96
Garage 86.61 16.28 88.83 18.09 68.79 19.73 72.69 23.35
Rooms –17.52 –0.74 –30.70 –1.70 –90.76 –4.79 –43.57 –3.45
Rooms^2 4.29 1.14 8.47 2.97 15.96 5.31 10.23 4.78
Rooms^3 –0.09 –0.45 –0.36 –2.56 –0.57 –3.77 –0.37 –3.26
Constant 162.48 0.82 561.56 3.40 253.55 2.66 8.21 0.12
Local authority district dummies Local authority district dummies Local authority district dummies Local authority district dummies
MS2 32.43 0.77 TW2 131.83 3.03 SY2 –2.13 –0.32 WY2 9.35 1.93
MS3 1.52 0.13 TW3 48.10 4.07 SY3 5.68 1.11 WY3 –4.20 –1.03
MS4 32.20 0.82 TW4 49.62 2.61 SY4 44.36 2.23 WY4 39.60 6.52
MS5 30.11 1.35 TW5 4.96 0.75 WY5 –24.21 –5.25
No. of obs. 2,878 2,377 3,763 4,750
F 75.630 54.390 109.100 323.040
R
2 0.591 0.559 0.609 0.611
RMSE 82.993 72.522 71.375 77.507TABLE 2 continued
Overall Tax Effects on Real Purchase Price: IV Estimation (Dependent Variable: Real Purchase Price)
West Midlands Greater Manchester Inner London Outer London
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
TaxBill –9.57 –2.05 –11.81 –4.98 –12.67 –2.41 –12.21 –2.18
Services –13.08 –1.30 –6.90 –1.11 14.76 0.94 7.39 0.74
(New Built)
Age-I –20.25 –2.09 –45.21 –4.91 –101.58 –3.88 –45.91 –2.99
Age-II –22.89 –2.67 –49.29 –5.60 –131.80 –5.10 –70.43 –4.88
Age-III –22.66 –2.63 –64.57 –7.07 –195.67 –7.19 –147.92 –9.96
Age-IV –17.15 –2.01 –46.26 –5.35 –158.95 –6.26 –94.84 –6.55
Age-V –3.67 –0.36 –15.96 –1.60 –55.52 –1.86 –59.23 –3.78
(Terraced)
Bung 196.61 15.73 150.73 24.39 38.42 0.54 167.41 11.31
Detach 215.67 23.28 206.79 31.24 177.81 7.23 269.23 26.29
Semi 52.95 12.62 66.28 18.74 70.99 6.15 69.36 13.93
Flat-I –2.04 –0.16 36.99 2.24 –18.77 –1.81 –25.27 –3.95
Flat-II –23.24 –3.30 29.37 3.67 –52.30 –5.57 –49.14 –8.90
Garage 73.86 17.78 58.37 19.00 115.18 11.00 112.08 22.35
Rooms –37.79 –1.78 –91.49 –6.52 86.88 4.38 –8.87 –0.51
Rooms^2 5.88 1.68 16.82 7.47 –8.47 –2.62 5.50 1.79
Rooms^3 0.01 0.04 –0.61 –5.37 0.49 2.97 –0.06 –0.37
Constant 395.29 2.78 409.43 5.17 109.63 0.32 67.23 0.38West Midlands Greater Manchester Inner London Outer London
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Local authority district dummies Local authority district dummies Local authority district dummies Local authority district dummies
WM2 3.39 0.62 GM2 –1.68 –0.21 IL2 –172.00 –2.38 OL2 225.59 4.59
WM3 –70.62 –2.41 GM3 59.02 1.76 IL3 –160.95 –4.84 OL3 138.14 2.96
WM4 –55.69 –7.29 GM4 0.15 0.03 IL4 –55.79 –1.53 OL4 195.02 9.88
WM5 33.32 1.12 GM5 14.07 1.45 IL5 –68.03 –1.84 OL5 180.73 3.26
WM6 –47.27 –5.87 GM6 5.99 0.73 IL6 46.47 0.71 OL6 165.76 3.62
WM7 –35.77 –3.44 GM7 35.66 3.63 IL7 –141.11 –4.30 OL7 186.54 6.77
GM8 12.83 2.05 IL8 –176.16 –2.80 OL8 197.78 4.19
GM9 43.11 4.44 IL9 –175.13 –6.62 OL9 181.35 6.25
GM10 –26.97 –5.41 IL10 –263.72 –12.03 OL10 242.76 5.20
IL11 –68.15 –0.89 OL11 185.93 3.92









No. obs. 4,408 No. obs. 5,261 No. obs. 3,139 No. obs. 7,540






RMSE 92.791 RMSE 77.436 RMSE 159.730 RMSE 140.700
Notes to whole of Table 2: All equations include 35 quarterly dummy variables. Standard errors use White’s method (White, 1980). See Appendix Table A.1 for
key to districts. See Table 1 for key to variables.Fiscal Studies
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higher property prices in such localities. Such effects were not found here. The
coefficient attached to the instrumented expenditure variable (Services) carries a
positive and significant sign only in a single instance. Generally, the coefficients
on the expenditure variable are inconsistent and insignificant, and remained so
over a number of alternative formulations attempted. The way that service
expenditure figures remain invariant over households observed in the same
locality at the same point in time will make it difficult to pick up such effects
even if they exist, especially on top of location-specific and time-specific dummy
variables.
However, the major focus of interest here relates to the coefficients attached
to the tax variables included in the IV estimation of equation (3), and here the
results are consistent and encouraging. These coefficients and their t-values have
been extracted and collected in Table 3, where they are presented in the first
column. All the coefficients are statistically significant, and they are all negative,
as expected, showing higher housing prices where levels of rates payable are
lower. All the coefficient values lie within the quite narrow range between –8
and –13.
As noted above, the degree of capitalisation of local taxes, measuring the
proportion of the present value of the future stream of local tax liabilities that is
incorporated into current asset price, is related to the magnitude of the
TABLE 3




Implied rate of tax
capitalisation




Tyne & Wear –8.82 26.5
(–2.01)
South Yorkshire –10.22 30.7
(–3.25)
West Yorkshire –8.53 25.6
(–3.11)
West Midlands –9.57 28.7
(–2.05)
Greater Manchester –11.81 35.4
(–4.98)
Inner London –12.67 38.0
(–2.41)
Outer London –12.21 36.6
(–2.18)House Prices and Local Taxes in the UK
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coefficients attached to the tax variables presented here. However, the extent of
tax capitalisation, k1, may only be extracted conditional on a known or assumed
level of real discount rate. As we saw above,
r a k × − = ) ˆ ( 1 1
where  1 ˆ a  is the estimated coefficient in Table 3. Consideration of returns on
minimum-risk government debt and the level of expected inflation, centred on
1985, imply that the real rate of discount probably lies between 2 and 5 per cent.
For the purposes of the exercise here, the real rate of discount, r, will be taken as
3 per cent, but the reader may easily substitute an alternative preferred value.
The second column of Table 3 contains the estimates of the degree of tax
capitalisation derived from the estimates for coefficients presented in the first
column, for a 3 per cent real discount rate and the assumptions of expectations of
unchanged future taxes and an infinite life for housing. As may be seen by
inspection, the local tax capitalisation estimates here lie at and around 33 per
cent, implying that about one-third of any changes in tax liabilities falling on
housing are incorporated into house prices.
V. HOUSE PRICE INFLATION AND THE POLL TAX
It remains to use the results obtained above to estimate the effects on general
housing prices resultant from the switch from rates to poll tax in 1990. The
analysis here will consider rates as an ad valorem tax on housing and the poll tax
as a lump-sum tax on residence. No account will be taken of the (probably small)
income effects of the reform; and it is assumed there is no effect from the reform
on local expenditure levels by local authorities. The exercise also has to maintain
that individuals believed, at least at the time of its instigation, that the poll tax
would remain a permanent reform of the local tax system.
Given that the poll tax moved the base for local taxation entirely from
housing onto residency, and with capitalisation effects, the price of housing will
increase. The estimation of the effects of the removal of rates, applying the
results from Table 2, are contained in Table 4. These results use the appropriate
figures and estimating equation for each metropolitan area taken one by one. The
method takes the sample average (real) rates payable in tax year 1985–86, the
central year for the study, as in column (1) of Table 4. Column (2) presents the
estimated effect of these rates payable on the purchase price for the mean sample
metropolitan dwelling for that jurisdiction. As may be seen, the central estimate
is that the removal of rates on housing would increase sample house prices by
between 10 and 17 per cent, as shown in column (3). Over the period from tax
year 1985–86 until 1990–91, the actually-observed, real  rates of house price
inflation for the sample database for each metropolitan area were as presented in
column (4). The final column shows that the simulation implies around 30 perFiscal Studies
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cent of the real price increases of the period may, therefore, be attributable to the
replacement of rates by the poll tax.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper has sought to establish the extent to which the replacement of rates by
the poll tax during 1990 contributed to the house price inflation of the late
1980s. Using an asset-pricing approach, a model and estimation procedure were
described, which proved able to establish an inverse connection between the
level of local rates liability and house price. With a large dataset, consistent and
plausible estimates of the critical parts of the model were obtained, over eight
large administrative jurisdictions for the period leading up to the tax reform.
These results strongly support the proposition that local tax liabilities attached to
housing are reflected in housing prices. Estimates were obtained for the degree
of capitalisation into house prices of local tax under rates at around 33 per cent.
Given these empirical results, estimates may be made of the effects on the
market price of housing of the introduction of the poll tax. Using the tax changes
associated with the removal of the local tax on housing consumption, estimates
indicated that around 10–17 per cent rises in the real price of housing may have
been associated with the tax reform. The period in question saw substantial
actual rises in the real price of owner-occupied housing in the UK. The estimates
TABLE 4































Merseyside 434.3 3,921.8 +0.161 +0.521 0.309
Tyne & Wear 304.7 2,688.8 +0.125 +0.462 0.271
South Yorkshire 313.9 3,209.3 +0.152 +0.447 0.341
West Yorkshire 280.5 2,393.7 +0.102 +0.432 0.237
West Midlands 390.6 3,739.6 +0.146 +0.542 0.269
Greater Manchester 345.9 4,083.7 +0.171 +0.608 0.282
Inner London 471.1 5,968.5 +0.134 +0.310 0.432
Outer London 431.0 5,260.6 +0.117 +0.324 0.360
Notes: All figures are derived from sample. All figures in real 1985 terms.House Prices and Local Taxes in the UK
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here suggest that around 30 per cent of the observed rise in real house prices
over the late 1980s may be attributed to the removal of rates payable on housing.
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Key for Local Authority Dummies
Merseyside Tyne & Wear South Yorkshire West Yorkshire Outer London
MS1 Knowsley TW1 Gateshead SY1 Barnsley WY1 Bradford OL1 Barking
MS2 Liverpool TW2 Newcastle SY2 Doncaster WY2 Calderdale OL2 Barnet
MS3 St Helens TW3 North Tyneside SY3 Rotherham WY3 Kirklees OL3 Bexley
MS4 Sefton TW4 South Tyneside SY4 Sheffield WY4 Leeds OL4 Brent
MS5 Wirral TW5 Sunderland WY5 Wakefield OL5 Bromley
OL6 Croydon
OL7 Ealing
West Midlands Greater Manchester Inner London OL8 Enfield
WM1 Birmingham GM1 Bolton IL1 Camden OL9 Haringey
WM2 Coventry GM2 Bury IL2 Greenwich OL10 Harrow
WM3 Dudley GM3 Manchester IL3 Hackney OL11 Havering
WM4 Sandwell GM4 Oldham IL4 Hammersmith OL12 Hillingdon
WM5 Solihull GM5 Rochdale IL5 Islington OL13 Hounslow
WM6 Walsall GM6 Salford IL6 Kensington OL14 Kingston
WM7 Wolverhampton GM7 Southport IL7 Lambeth OL15 Merton
GM8 Tameside IL8 Lewisham OL16 Newham
GM9 Trafford IL9 Southwark OL17 Redbridge
GM10 Wigan IL10 Tower Hamlets OL18 Richmond
IL11 Wandsworth OL19 Sutton
IL12 Westminster OL20 Waltham Forest
Notes: Key to abbreviations used in Table 2. In each Metropolitan County, the first district is the excluded district dummy variable.